Don’t Make Us Choose Sides: Southeast Asian Perspectives of U.S. Strategy and Presence in the Region

I am pleased to share my latest report, Don’t Make Us Choose Sides: Southeast Asian Perspectives of U.S. Strategy and Presence in the Region.

This report takes a meta view of Southeast Asian perspectives of U.S.-China competition, particularly the securitization of economic relationships, the prospect of military conflict affecting the region, and the growing challenges (and diminished prospects) of benefitting from relations with both China and the United States.

It looks at diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of US-China relations and the potential risks to Southeast Asia in each sector.  Southeast Asian states are distrustful of both powers, driven by concerns about China’s motives and hegemonic ambitions, and uncertainty about U.S. reliability and the sustainment of Washington’s commitment to the region.   Distrust, coupled with geographic, cultural, and ideological diversity in the region sometimes leaves the region struggling to articulate what it seeks.  It is clear what the region does not want – to choose sides – but there is little consensus on that the region wants, other than for the U.S. and China to get along.

Diplomacy

The United States’ diplomatic and national interests in Southeast Asia are far greater than leveraging the region as part of a successful competitive strategy to counter China. For Southeast Asian states, a worst-case scenario is Washington only perceiving Southeast Asia’s value in the context of U.S.-China competition – a theatre of competition - which would likely lead Washington to aggressively pressure Southeast Asian states to choose sides and bandwagon to counter China’s rise. That outcome is avoidable, providing Southeast Asian states continue to exercise their own agency and pursue their current strategies of inclusivity, and remain comfortable reassuring the U.S. of the future potential for the development of bilateral relations based on their own merits. Southeast Asian states will need to avoid resistance to deepening relations with the U.S. because of fears how Beijing might react, which could result in the very zero-sum polarization they seek to avoid.

Military

The United States is the leading military cooperation partner in Southeast Asia, though the most meaningful U.S. military relationships are spread unevenly, centered on Singapore and the Philippines, while China's military relationships are strongest in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, exacerbating concerns about US-China competition causing blocks to form.  Southeast Asian countries are also concerned about the potential for a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan following China’s militaristic response to Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in August 2022. Southeast Asian states are unified in their desire to avoid being drawn into a cross-Strait conflict, but it is increasingly clear that the consequences of a cross-Strait conflict cannot be avoided by Southeast Asia.

Trade & Economics

The United States has missed a major strategic opportunity to extend its influence and presence in the region by opting out of trade agreements involving ASEAN economies, despite sparse bilateral agreements such as the U.S.-Singapore FTA and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. There are still reservoirs of goodwill towards the U.S. economic presence in the region however, which Washington can continue to leverage despite China’s dominant economic position. Southeast Asian partners are particularly worried about the prospect of decoupling between the U.S. and China disrupting their trade and economic relationships, as well as prospects for future growth, but there are potential opportunities for regional partners to benefit from evolving U.S. industrial policy. While there are concerns about the loss of jobs and investment from home-shoring trends, friend-shoring will undoubtedly continue as global companies and capital seek efficient markets with lower costs of production, and fewer political risks than China. Not meeting Southeast Asian expectations for economic engagement lessens the United States’ overall attractiveness and credibility as a reliable partner in the region.

I am grateful to colleagues at the US Institute of Peace who supported the project resulting in this publication.