Implications of the Rectification of the Strategic Rocket Force Leadership
The removal of the PLA officers affirms that that our ability to understand what is happening in China is limited to observing outcomes, rather than the inputs that result in outcomes.
On July 31, Xi Jinping held a surprise public ceremony to promote two lieutenant general officers to general announcing that deputy chief of the PLA Navy Wang Houbin would become the head of China’s Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) replacing Li Yuchao, and deputy political commissar of the Southern Theatre Command Xu Xisheng would replace Xu Zhongbo as SRF political commissar, validating widespread rumors that the current head, along with the current and former deputy leaders of the SRF were in deep trouble and under some form of investigation.
There has been no official statement about why the current leaders of the SRF were removed, what their current status is now, or who else in the PLA is under investigation in connection to these officers. Without verifiable facts, analysis is based on impressions and instinct, however, so alternate interpretations to mine are completely plausible and valid. Facing so many unknowns, speculation and rumors have dominated discussion. Without transparency, particularly without authoritative, credible statements from China’s leadership, we are left guessing. That does not prevent rational analysis about what we do and do not know, however, including analysis about what the change in command at the SRF tells us about the PLA under Xi Jinping, and some possible implications for the United States.
Firstly, the removal of the senior leadership of the SRF raises questions about the governance and performance of the Communist Party of China (CPC) under Xi Jinping, and how this style of governance affects perceptions within Chinese organizations. The removal of these two officers was concurrent to the equally opaque month-long disappearance and awkward replacement of China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang. One of the more outlandish rumors circulating were that the former Ambassador to the US was somehow connected to an espionage case involving the son of the head of the SRF who lives in the United States. I don’t think that is believable, but the lack of official information created a credibility vacuum that could be filled by anything.
The lack of transparency, specifically forthright explanations by government spokespersons harms China’s credibility on multiple levels, and leaves analysts speculating about not only the rationale for these personnel shifts, but the scope and extent of what is happening. My instinct tells me this is not an anti-corruption case, but a more politicized effort to replace active and retired senior officers that Xi believes present a political risk to the party. These officials are potentially judged to be disloyal, or less than absolutely loyal to Xi and the Party.
An effort such as this akin to a rectification campaign, similar to past efforts in CPC history to sort the loyal from the disloyal. For the campaign within the PLA, there is an iceberg effect. We know that the SRF commander Li Yuchao and his deputy Liu Guangbin have been replaced (and the deputy commander Wu Guohua reportedly committed suicide in early July), but we can not confirm the pervasive rumors that the campaign encompasses former SRF officers. Key former SRF officers who are rumored to be in trouble include former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, vice chief of the Central Military Commission’s Joint Staff Department Zhang Zhenzhong, and deputy commander of the Strategic Support force and commander of the Space Force lieutenant general Shang Hong. Such a widespread purge of officers likely involves the detention and investigation of scores of subordinate officers who will be interrogated to develop evidence incriminating the principals. This will have implications for the daily operations and effectiveness of the SRF, which has strategic implications for the CPC, as well as more mundane effects resulting from an organization suffering from low morale, and possibly paralysis stemming from fear and uncertainty.
Whether this campaign is driven by political loyalty or economic corruption concerns, the ramifications of poor discipline in the organ responsible to China’s nukes is concerning.
I do not believe this is a purely economic corruption campaign. Corruption is endemic in the PLA, and if this campaign is about stopping promotion-buying, contractor kick-backs, conflicts-of-interest, it would be broader than the SRF, and there is probably lower-hanging fruit in other PLA branches such as the PLA Navy, which has had a few high-visibility financial scandals, but its leadership and retired Admirals appear to have escaped punishment. Logistics organs responsible for acquisitions and sustainment contracts are more productive targets for financial-corruption crackdowns.
There is sparse evidence that what is happening to the SRF leadership is about economic corruption, but there is no hard evidence that it is entirely political either. The two are not mutually exclusive – financial anti-corruption probes are the means for Xi Jinping to achieve the ends of absolute political loyalty. In mid-June I spoke with a PLA analyst in China about new rules governing social interactions for current and retired PLA officers, which included guidelines on speaking to media, engaging with family members, and communications using social media. The analyst asserted that the impetus for the rules was discussions in private chat groups where senior retired officers and people associated with them complained publicly about PLA reforms. My contact noted that vice chief of the Joint Staff and former SRF deputy Zhang Zhenzhong’s absence from the early-June Shangri-La Dialogue was likely connected to internal efforts to root out disloyal officers and part of the response effort to quiet very senior officials complaining in private groups. Whether the corruption in the SRF is primarily about political loyalty or financial malfeasance, it is undoubtedly a critical concern for Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping oversaw the creation of the SRF as part of the once-in-a-generation reform of the PLA initiated in 2016, implicitly connects the SRF’s fortunes to Xi’s.
Secondly, the SRF leadership transition and how it came about raises serious concerns about command and control of China’s nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles that would deliver them. I don’t think the campaign to remove senior SRF officers increases the risk of an accidental launch, or the loss of actual control of warheads. The lack of transparency surrounding the campaign is consistent with PLA doctrine, particularly for the notoriously secretive missileers. The lack of transparency (as well as internal security efforts to isolate units from one another for counter-intelligence purposes) possibly presents challenges for the SRF’s leadership and the PLA’s discipline inspection units overseeing and enforcing political correctness, military effectiveness, and financial propriety. Pervasive opacity likewise creates challenges for the U.S. to interpret changes in SRF posture over time, as well as challenges to interpret operational signals in both peacetime and crisis. Sudden, secretive turnover of senior personnel creates obstacles to what few opportunities there are for academic exchanges, and underscores need for official strategic nuclear dynamics dialogues between the U.S. and China to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding or miscalculation.
Lastly, what does this tell us about the PLA under Xi Jinping?
It affirms a few things we already know.
It affirms that Beijing’s decision-making is opaque, and that our ability to understand what is happening in China is most often limited to observing outcomes, rather than the inputs that result in those outcomes.
The appointment of Wang Houbin who made his career in the East and South Sea fleets, and Xu Xisheng who comes from the Southern Theater Command reminds us that Taiwan remains the main focus of the PLA’s modernization effort.
The PLA is still a political, rather than a professional military. The PLA is the armed wing of the Communist Party after all. Alistair Gale and Chun Han Wong at the Wall Street Journal observed that the SRF’s new political commissar Xu Xisheng is a CPC Central Committee member who politically outranks the SRF commander Wang Houbin, who is neither a full or alternate member of the Central Committee. It is unclear to me whether that dynamic will make SRF staff meetings more awkward, or whether their status as two outsiders with no previous experience managing strategic missiles or nuclear warheads will create friction within the organization. (The previous SRF commander and political commissar were both alternate members of the Central Committee.) What is immensely clear from this episode is that Xi’s personality-centric governance model requires absolute loyalty, a heightened sense of political awareness, and discretion on the part of high-level officers. Despite Xi Jinping’s recurring exhortations to the PLA to be ever-more adept at fighting a future war, politics and loyalty to Xi and the Party are undoubtedly going to continue to be a primary focus for the PLA.
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