The PLA has stopped flying aircraft close to Taiwan - I can't figure out why and that worries me

I never expected to be worried by the lack of Chinese military coercion.

Since February 27, no PLA Air Force planes have entered Taiwan’s ADIZ or crossed the Taiwan Strait median line. Zero. Zip. Nada.

An entire week of no intrusions:

(Source: PLAtracker.com)

The number of days without an intrusion in February also hit a historic low.

Why?

(Source: PLAtracker.com)

Air operations around Taiwan invariably decline when bad weather such as a typhoon sweeps into the area, but the weather has been relatively good over the past week. There are normally below average PLA operations every winter. Spring Festival holidays and winter weather conditions are rational explanations for reduced ops. I am not a meteorologist, but I didn’t observe exceptionally foul weather this February.

One must watch the weather when analyzing PLA military operations. Winds and waves pick up in the Taiwan Strait in the winter. The Taiwan Strait is a funnel that intensifies winds. The Strait is calm in the spring. Perfect for amphibious operations.

But that doesn’t entirely explain why there has been a dramatic drop in operations this year, particularly in February.

There have been 21 days with no PLA flights around Taiwan since the announcement on January 25 that Vice Chairman of the Central Military Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli are under investigation.

I don’t think the demise of these two senior officers is a causal factor for the reduction in flights. PLA missions around Taiwan have increased steadily despite the persistent purge of the PLA’s top ranks since Xi came to power in 2012. Were Zhang Youxia or Liu Zhenli the strongest advocates for PLA coercion missions? Now that they are purged have the surviving PLA generals and Xi Jinping determined it is time to re-think their approach to military coercion and see if honey catches more flies than vinegar? Color me skeptical.

The National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, China’s highest-profile annual political meetings are taking place March 4 to 11 in Beijing. I don’t think the “Two Meetings” affect PLA operations around Taiwan like this. Previous years’ meetings have not seen significantly reduced operations in the month prior to the meetings, so there is no precedence. [See CSIS China Power Project’s analysis showing consistent operations drop-offs during the Two Meetings.]

This reduction in operations concerns me, partly because the explanations so far are not satisfying.

It therefore bears watching.

The reduction of operations ahead of a potential military campaign could indicate conservation of resources, reduction in wear and tear on military platforms, increased or accelerated maintenance cycles and ahead of an intense campaign. If large numbers of PLA aircraft and ships suddenly stand down and go into maintenance and repair at the same time, especially ahead of the spring good-weather window, that raises concerns. Military intelligence looks for Indications and Warnings (I&W) of a coming conflict and this would be a big one.

But there would be many other indications of preparations for an imminent war that would be obvious and observable. Dry docks and piers full of ships being repaired. Mass mobilization and requisition of civilian resources. Reserves being called up. PLA units flowing from the Central, Northern and Western to the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands. These would all be noticeable. I’m not seeing them.

Is the PLA preparing for a decapitating strike against Taiwan? President Trump has already done it twice this year. Could Xi Jinping be suffering from FOMO? If the PLA eliminates President Lai, Vice President Hsiao and Premier Cho, the next in line of succession is Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu from the Kuomintang party - a more acceptable leader from Beijing’s perspective.

But the shift in the pattern of missions around Taiwan by the PLA does not strike me as preparation for a decapitation mission. While there is no doubt the PLA is preparing to attack Taiwan and it has built urban warfare training facilities simulating Taipei and the Presidential Office, I don’t think the PLA is ready to pull off a Venezuela-style intervention, or a precision strike against Taiwan’s leadership. The risk of failure is high for the inexperienced PLA and the political fallout for anything less than a perfect outcome would likely see Xi sharing a cell with his former generals.

That said, there is a reason Chinese intelligence agencies have recruited key Taiwanese government staffers and enticed them to share details about leadership schedules. Exactly the sort of intelligence needed for an effective decapitating strike. I am sure China wants the ability to do what the US recently did in Venezuela, I just don’t think the PLA is there yet, and I don’t think Xi is a gambler.

So if it is not preparation for an invasion, or a decapitation strike… what is it?

Is it possible that Beijing is sending a message to Taipei? A positive message?

Maybe.

On 24 February, President Lai addressed a Spring Festival gathering of Taiwanese businesspeople and reportedly used the phrase “Mainland China” several times, rather than just “China” (which he also used in the speech). That makes Beijing happy because the phrase “Mainland China” implies there is “one China,” with part on the mainland and the other part offshore.

A friend in Beijing thinks that it is possible Beijing has taken note of President Lai’s Spring Festival statement and interpreted this as a positive gesture, and may use PLA flights as a signal to encourage him to accept the 1992 Consensus and stop moves towards independence.

That might explain the stand down over the past week, but not the days and weeks prior to President Lai’s remarks. I would be shocked if President Lai shared his intentions with Beijing weeks ahead of delivering his toast.

My friends in Taipei are skeptical. One remarked, “I don’t think they are gonna let Lai off the hook that easily even just for a few days…”

Other factors could be at play, too. Beijing is watching politicking in Taipei closely, including the deliberations between President Lai and the KMT-led Legislative Yuan over defense spending. Reducing military coercion and signaling could give the KMT more bargaining space, perhaps enhancing their argument that engagement with China is more effective than military deterrence.

President Lai could potentially gain some political capital with the KMT by underscoring that he does not seek to antagonize Beijing and is willing to compromise to get the $40 billion special defense budget passed by the legislature.

Is Beijing trying to help the political process in Taipei to pass a special defense budget that will result in more arms sales? That doesn’t make sense.

President Trump is expected to visit Beijing starting around March 31. I would be shocked if Beijing is reducing military missions around Taiwan to influence President Trump. PLA missions around Taiwan are a message to Taipei, not Washington.

US military operations on China’s periphery are likely moderated to reduce tensions and the risk of an incident derailing the summit, however. Former Senior Director for Asia in the National Security Council makes this case, but PLA missions around Taiwan and US missions around China are not reciprocally associated with one another. The PLA and INDOPACOM have different objectives for their respective missions.

Just as the US may reduce operations ahead of a summit, it also does not hurt President Lai to take pragmatic measures to reduce cross-Strait tensions and not antagonize Beijing ahead of President Trump’s visit to China. Should Trump believe that Taipei is trying to undermine his engagement with China, it would not be good for President Lai.

But none of these factors convincingly explain why the PLA is reducing intrusions into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

I didn’t expect to be worried about the cessation of PLA operations around Taiwan, but the lack of a rational explanation is disconcerting.

Perhaps that is what Beijing is aiming for. Uncertainty.

Without transparency into Beijing’s decision-making, without meaningful military dialogues, we don’t understand or appreciate Beijing’s intentions. Misperception and misunderstanding will continue to be prominent if not the defining features in cross-Strait and US-China relations for the foreseeable future.

UPDATE - 7 March

Taiwan MND reported just now that two PLA aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ in the last 24 hours, ending the 7-day streak of no intrusions.

The Two Sessions is still going on and the Strait of Hormuz is still closed.

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